INDIA–CHINA RELATIONS: CAN THE TWO COUNTRIES COEXIST PEACEFULLY?

01 Nov 2026

Tags: International Relations   Neighborhood   Bilateral border relations

Source: The Hindu

Context: India–China relations are currently characterised by managed coexistence, with neither country at war but recurring border tensions threatening peace and stability.

• The article argues that peaceful coexistence is possible through strategic stability, mutual understanding, diplomatic engagement and avoidance of military confrontation.

Historical Background of India–China Tensions

• 1962 Sino-Indian War
  • The 1962 war, according to the author, was partly influenced by Mao Zedong's political overconfidence following the failure of the Great Leap Forward; historians also identify several other causes.
  • The conflict deepened India's distrust of China, particularly after the earlier Hindi–Chini Bhai Bhai phase of friendship.
  • Territorial losses and unresolved disputes in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh continue to influence bilateral relations.
• 2020 Galwan Valley Clash
  • The Galwan Valley clash between Indian and Chinese patrols in 2020 resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers, severely affecting bilateral trust.
  • The author argues that the present tensions cannot be explained solely through the 2020 incident; they have deeper historical, geopolitical and strategic roots.

Major Issues Affecting Bilateral Relations

• Unresolved Border Disputes
  • Western Sector (Ladakh): Improperly delineated and disputed border areas remain a major source of military confrontation.
  • Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh): Disagreements over the McMahon Line, which China does not recognise, contribute to persistent tensions.
  • Patrolling disputes: Differences in perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) frequently turn patrolling deviations into military face-offs, threatening border peace and tranquillity.
• Geopolitical Rivalry and External Factors
  • QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue): The U.S.-sponsored strategic grouping involving India, the United States, Japan and Australia has contributed to Chinese suspicions.
  • China views India's participation in QUAD as part of a U.S.-led strategy to contain its rise, reducing its willingness to improve bilateral relations.
  • The author cautions against allowing external geopolitical rivalries to determine the course of India–China relations.
• Mutual Distrust and Strategic Misperceptions
  • Historical mistrust, military deployments and competing geopolitical ambitions have reinforced negative perceptions on both sides.
  • Chinese strategic thinking often interprets India's growing engagement with the United States as an attempt to challenge China's regional position.
  • The author argues that India should distinguish between China's strategic competition and an existential threat to India's security.

Diplomatic Efforts Towards Normalisation

• Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 China Visit
  • Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to China and meeting with Deng Xiaoping marked a major turning point in bilateral relations.
  • It created opportunities for diplomatic engagement and enabled the border dispute to be discussed separately from other aspects of bilateral cooperation, reducing bureaucratic and military obstacles.
  • The author considers this initiative an important model for managing bilateral tensions and rebuilding mutual trust.
• 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles
  • India and China signed an agreement to establish a long-term constructive and cooperative partnership.
  • Article I: Neither country shall use or threaten to use force against the other.
  • Article VII: Any boundary settlement must safeguard the legitimate interests of settled populations in border areas.

Strategic and Military Dimensions

• Assessing China's Military Capabilities
  • China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have significantly advanced their capabilities for future warfare but, according to the author, are not yet fully world-class.
  • China's military modernisation includes long-range missiles, submarines, surveillance systems and amphibious warfare capabilities.
  • The author argues that India possesses substantial military capabilities in the high Himalayan region, making it more than a match for China in this specific theatre.
  • China's military strength should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated; India needs a realistic assessment of its capabilities and limitations.
• Avoiding Military Confrontation
  • Neither country has a strategic interest in initiating a direct war, as conflict would impose substantial economic and strategic costs.
  • A war with India could undermine China's ambition of becoming the world's leading power by 2049.
  • India also has no inclination to initiate a military confrontation with China.
  • Both countries must ensure that their military forces and border guards avoid inadvertent escalation and prevent incidents similar to Galwan.
  • Since neither country enjoys an overwhelming advantage in the disputed high-altitude Himalayan areas, restraint and avoidance of accidental escalation are essential.
• Understanding China's Strategic Outlook
  • Need for Better Understanding of China
  • India must develop a deeper understanding of China's strategic intentions, political thinking and national priorities to avoid actions that may trigger unintended responses.
  • China's growing research output on India does not necessarily translate into a better understanding of Indian society and strategic behaviour, as highlighted by The Economist.
  • The author cautions against assuming that China intends to test India's military strength or deliberately undermine its global position.
• China's Long-term Strategic Priorities
  • China's ambition to become the world's leading power by 2049 makes a costly military conflict with India strategically undesirable.
  • China's restraint regarding Taiwan, despite its military modernisation and stated objective of reunification, is cited by the author as an indication of strategic realism.
  • The proposed approach of building a constructive relationship of strategic stability, popularised in discussions between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump, could also guide India–China relations.
• Historical and National Identity Dimensions
  • China's national identity and territorial boundaries have historically evolved, particularly during the Qing Dynasty, whose territorial boundaries were relatively elastic.
  • Understanding the historical vulnerabilities and territorial evolution of the Qing Dynasty is important for understanding contemporary China's strategic outlook.
  • The author argues that China should not be viewed as an inherently cohesive or permanently expansionist entity; misreading its historical and strategic behaviour could have serious consequences for India.

Way Forward: Towards Peaceful Coexistence

• Restore diplomatic engagement: Revive the spirit of Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit through high-level political dialogue and sustained negotiations.
• Resolve border disputes: Pursue mutually acceptable boundary settlements while safeguarding the interests of settled border populations.
• Maintain border tranquillity: Strengthen military communication, patrolling protocols and confidence-building measures to prevent accidental escalation.
• Promote strategic stability: Separate bilateral cooperation from external geopolitical rivalries and avoid viewing every disagreement through a zero-sum framework.
• Adopt realistic threat assessment: Neither exaggerate China's military capabilities nor underestimate its strategic intentions; strengthen India's preparedness accordingly.
• Avoid military confrontation: Recognise the economic and strategic costs of war and prioritise diplomatic mechanisms for dispute resolution.
• Improve mutual understanding: Develop a nuanced understanding of China's history, political system, national interests and strategic priorities.

Important Concepts for UPSC

Line of Actual Control (LAC)

• The Line of Actual Control is the de facto boundary separating Indian- and Chinese-controlled territories.
• It is divided into three sectors:
  • Western Sector: Ladakh.
  • Middle Sector: Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
  • Eastern Sector: Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
• Unlike an internationally demarcated boundary, the LAC has differing perceptions in certain areas, resulting in overlapping claims and patrolling confrontations.

McMahon Line

• Established through the 1914 Simla Convention, negotiated between British India, Tibet and China.
• Named after British representative Sir Henry McMahon.
• Forms the basis of the boundary claimed by India in the eastern sector, including Arunachal Pradesh.
• China rejects its legitimacy, contributing to the unresolved eastern-sector boundary dispute.

QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)

• An informal strategic grouping comprising India, the United States, Japan and Australia.
• Focuses on a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, maritime security, critical technologies, infrastructure and regional cooperation.
• China views the grouping with suspicion, considering it a potential instrument of strategic containment.